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Abstract 
Scholars in innovation studies increasingly highlight that federal governments on the demand 
side spur innovation activities of government contractors. While government contractors tend 
to concentrate in capital cities, the kinds of regional innovation system (RIS) that occur around 
federal agencies remain poorly understood. Drawing on the RIS approach, this paper examines 
the actors and activities that are placed at the interface between public demand and private 
supply. The analysis draws on 122 interviews with RIS actors in Bern, The Hague, Ottawa and 
Washington, D.C. The results indicate that intermediaries play crucial roles in stimulating 
knowledge exchange between public demand and private supply. One important role relates to 
getting involved in policy formulation in order to enhance interactive learning in federal 
procurement practices. In interaction inspiring federal procurement policies, government 
contractors generate technical knowledge that they also can exploit through private sector 
clients.    
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1 Introduction 
There is an increasing interest among academics and policymakers in how to leverage federal 
procurement power for innovation (Edquist et al. 2015). The focus is on understanding 
facilitators and barriers to innovation (Edler et al. 2015; Georghiou et al. 2014), rather than on 
geographical patterns of innovation. Yet, government contractors strongly concentrate in 
capital cities (Wood 2006). They co-locate in close proximity to federal agencies on the demand 
side. Government contractors in Greater Washington, D.C., for example, captured $71.1 billion 
or 16% of federal procurement spending in 2015 (Fuller, 2016). In the development of complex 
government information technology (IT) systems, government contractors need to combine 
internal capabilities with external ones. They participate in knowledge exchange and interactive 
learning with other organizations (Landry, Amara, and Doloreux 2012). In this regard, a lot of 
emphasis is put on the region as the favorable geographical level for seeking innovation partners 
(see, e.g. Feldman 2000). Spatial proximity fosters trusted relationships through repeated face-
to-face interaction and facilitates knowledge spillovers. This suggests that capital cities play a 
crucial role in federal procurement of innovation. Thus, it is important to analyze knowledge 
dynamics in capital cities if we want to understand the spatial dimensions of federal 
procurement driven innovations.  
The Regional Innovation System (RIS) concept is among the most prominent ones to explain 
knowledge dynamics at the regional level (Asheim, Smith, and Oughton 2011; Doloreux and 
Parto 2005). However, since the concept has not yet been applied in the context of federal 
procurement, there are several shortcomings. RIS literature has ignored the fact that the state, 
here in the form of federal agencies, is a large buyer of services as well as products and therefore 
drives innovations from the demand side. Our understanding of territorial shaping of knowledge 
dynamics is almost exclusively derived from economic interactions to take advantage of private 
sector business opportunities (Strambach and Dieterich 2011). Thus, it remains unclear how the 
specific interaction patterns that are derived from federal business opportunities shape regional 
information flows and knowledge sharing. Moreover, while the RIS concept emphasizes that 
buyer-supplier interactions are embedded in a specific regional context with several knowledge 
sources (Trippl and Tödtling 2011), it is unknown what actors support buyer-supplier 
interactions in the distinct context of capital cities. 
In response to these limitations, the concentration of government contractors in capital cities 
(Vence-Deza and González-López 2014) is taken as a starting point to investigate the kinds of 
RISs that occur around federal agencies. Specifically, this paper focuses on the ways in which 
government contractors benefit from federal procurement shaped RIS in capital cities (CC-
RIS). It emphasizes the complex interaction patterns between public demand and private 
supply. Public demand, on the one side, is often associated with constraint procurement 
procedures, culture of bureaucracy, arm’s length relationships, non-profit incentives, and risk-
averse government officials (Mergel and Desouza 2013; Roodhooft and Van den Abbeele 
2006). Private supply, in the form of IT government contractors, on the other side, is usually 
associated with rapidly changing technologies, collaborative strategic relationships, and risk-
taking entrepreneurs (Trippl, Tödtling, and Lengauer 2009). In federal procurement, capital 
cities become crucial places where both sectors encounter one another. CC-RISs need to 
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function as bridges between both sectors and need to help to overcome gaps between both 
paradigms.  
The intensity of complex interaction patterns between public demand and private supply is 
special to capital cities, yet the interaction is not expected to unfold in the same ways in different 
cases. The formation of CC-RIS is highly interrelated with federal procurement innovation 
policies. Federal procurement policies strive to stimulate either competition or cooperation 
(Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia 2012). Competition, as a policy goal, leads to arm’s length 
relationships in order to not favor any government contractors. Cooperation is based on the 
perception that innovative outcomes can be achieved when federal agencies share information 
and ideas with government contractors. Innovation is not only discussed in regard to making 
government services more effective and efficient but also in regard to making the private sector 
more innovative and competitive (Rolfstam 2008). Federal procurement projects empower 
government contractors to exploit knowledge through private sector clients (Uyarra et al. 2014).  
This paper examines the kinds of RISs that occur around federal agencies in capital cities by 
raising the following questions: 
 What actors and activities are placed at the interface of public demand and private 
supply in capital cities? 
 How exactly do government contractors benefit from being located in the capital city? 
 How does federal procurement contribute to a more diversified regional economic base?  
In order to address these research questions, the paper makes use of an extensive multiple-case 
study methodology (Stake 2006). Washington, D.C., Ottawa, Bern and The Hague provide 
interesting cases in order to study CC-RISs. The four cases are so called secondary capital cities 
(SCC) because they are not the economic center of their nation (Mayer et al. 2016). As such, 
they lack a more diversified regional economic base and are fairly dependent on federal 
government spending. Thus, regional policymakers are particularly challenged to leverage the 
presence of federal agencies for private sector jobs by improving CC-RIS functions. The four 
cases have been enriched through a total of 122 semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with 
regional key informants. 
 
2 Conceptualizing regional innovation systems of capital cities 
The analysis of innovation activities that take place around federal agencies on the demand side 
draws on the concept of RIS. A RIS can be defined as “a set of interacting private and public 
interests, formal institutions, and other organizations that function according to organizational 
and institutional arrangements and relationships conducive to the generation, use, and 
dissemination of knowledge” (Doloreux and Parto 2005, 134).  The definition strongly 
emphasizes knowledge processing. Thus, for the purpose of this paper, an innovation is defined 
as “the visible result of knowledge dynamics” (Strambach and Dieterich 2011, 4).   
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Federal procurement and innovation 
Federal procurement policies highly influence knowledge dynamics in CC-RIS. While being 
the driver for knowledge dynamics at the regional level, federal procurement is regulated at the 
federal level. Federal procurement policies change the regulatory framework as well as shape 
behavior of government officials and thus create the conditions under which interactive learning 
in CC-RIS takes place (Gertler 2002).  
Federal procurement policies encourage either competition or cooperation (Roodhooft and Van 
den Abbeele 2006). In competition inspiring policies, detailed requirements and specifications 
in request for proposals lead to very similar proposals and therefore government contractors 
mainly compete based on price as opposed to innovation. Stringent competition is also achieved 
through as few interactions as possible between government contractors and federal agencies 
in order to not favor any government contractor. In cooperation inspiring policies, federal 
agencies and government contractors develop a mutual understanding about the agency’s need 
(Bovaird 2006). In PPI studies, cooperation is seen as a necessary precondition for the 
development of innovation through federal procurement (Edquist et al. 2015). Obviously, there 
is tension between both policy goals since intensive interactions and trustful partnerships are 
favorable for innovation but provide a competitive advantage for the involved government 
contractors. 
Innovation policies in federal procurement aim to widen the regular federal procurement 
process toward cooperation and alternative solutions (Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia 2012). 
The stylized regular open federal procurement process can be divided into the following stages: 
- Federal agency defines technical requirements in detail 
- Federal agency publishes request for proposals online 
- Proposals are selected based on predefined criteria (with a strong focus on price and 
references) 
- A contract is awarded based on the proposal of the government contractor 
- Development of the service 
While this process has been developed in the context of standardized products and services, it 
is not appropriate for complex IT government systems (Burnett 2009). Originating from this 
regular process, there are many policies that focus on transforming this process into a more 
interactive, innovation-oriented one. Through the implementation of additional steps in the 
early phases, public demand and private supply is better coordinated. Moreover, public demand 
can be combined with other innovation policies (Edler and Georghiou 2007). For example, a 
federal agency provides R&D funding to a government contractor and holds out the prospect 
of buying the result, so called pre-commercial procurement. It is also important to avoid over-
detailed technical requirements as they constrain the possibilities for alternative solutions. 
Instead, outcome-based specifications enable the introduction of innovations (Timmermans and 
Zabala-Iturriagagoitia 2013). Moreover, policies address the behavior of government officials 
since there are incentives for government officials to behave in ways that hamper innovation 
(Boyne 2002). Too close of relationships between government officials and government 
contractor may cause the unsuccessful contractors to file a bid protest, whereas arm’s length 
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relationships do not create any problems for the individual. So it creates an incentive for 
government officials to behave in a rejecting and risk-averse manner. 
Another set of policies aims to increase the participation of small- and medium- sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in federal procurement. Strong participation of SMEs in federal 
procurement increases the number and variety of proposals and thus leads to a higher chance 
of innovative solutions (Uyarra and Flanagan 2010). SMEs are also seen as drivers of more 
disruptive technological changes (Acs 2009). Yet, SMEs face many barriers in federal 
procurement including size of contracts, the need to provide track records, and the costs for 
preparing proposals (Loader 2013). Thus, any policy that aims to increase the participation of 
SMEs in federal procurement can be seen as an innovation policy. 
 
Actors and linkages 
A CC-RIS encompasses a unique set of actors (Gordon 2013). To understand knowledge 
dynamics in a CC-RIS, it is important to precisely point out the actors that engage in knowledge 
mediation between government contractors and government clients (Markusen 2003).  
First, government contractors mediate knowledge between other government contractors and 
government clients in the form of partners and competitors. A common practice in federal 
procurement of IT services is that projects are developed in teams of government contractors 
(Grabher 2002). A prime contractor collaborates closely with one or more subcontractors and 
solutions are developed as a team effort. Teams are organized around a particular problem and 
include individuals and firms with different capabilities and skills (Hearn, Rodrigues and 
Bridgstock 2014). As a result, federal procurement projects provide a stimulating environment 
for collective learning processes (Ibert 2004). The selection of partner firms, therefore, is a 
critical activity that affects a government contractor’s business success (Sedita and Apa 2015).  
Second, associations are key actors at the interface between government contractors and federal 
agencies (Koschatzky et al. 2014). CC-RISs are full of associations such as chambers of 
commerce, trade unions, employers’ associations, and national sector associations (Gerhard 
2007). The latter, in particular, provide intermediary functions relevant to the context of federal 
procurement. National sector associations stimulate regional linkages through conferences, 
meetings, exhibitions, and social gatherings (Smedlund 2006). In bringing together actors that 
are relevant to federal procurement, national sector associations help to exploit the resources 
that exist in a region in order to spur innovation activities (Tura and Harmaakorpi 2005). The 
organization of federal procurement in project-teams intensifies the need for coordination 
among potential partner firms (Sedita and Apa 2015). When searching for partner firms, 
government contractors face substantial transaction costs due to information asymmetries. For 
example, information asymmetries relate to how partner firms balance their own interests and 
their commitment to the federal procurement project over the course of time (Teng 1998). In 
the field of IT services, information asymmetries are particularly high, as they provide services 
which cannot fully be evaluated a priori (Aarikka-Stenroos and Jaakkola 2012). National sector 
associations help government contractors to reduce uncertainties by stimulating the formation 
 6 
 
of trusted relations among their member firms (Glückler and Armbruster 2003; Maennig and 
Ölschläger 2011).   
Third, regional public and semi-public development organizations facilitate knowledge 
dynamics between federal agencies and government contractors. They support government 
contractors by providing the “soft infrastructure of innovation” (Cooke 2001, 946). They do so 
by initiating linkages between CC-RIS actors, fostering knowledge circulation, and shaping 
regional development strategies (Lagendijk and Cornford 2000). Activities that stimulate and 
harness knowledge dynamics between government contractors and federal agencies can create 
conflicts between regional and federal interests (Howells 2005). Development organizations act 
on behalf of regional interests, whereas federal agencies act on behalf of federal interests. The 
extent to which regional knowledge dynamics create benefits for the country as a whole 
influences the degree to which federal agencies are willing to engage in regional knowledge 
dynamics. Thus, development agencies need to demonstrate how regional knowledge dynamics 
lead to a more innovative, efficient, and effective public sector.   
Fourth, knowledge organizations support innovation activities of government contractors 
(Caniëls and Bosch 2010). Federal research laboratories, think tanks, and university institutes, 
for example, generate and pool knowledge that is relevant to the context of federal procurement. 
This includes not only knowledge about developments in technology but also knowledge about 
developments at the federal marketplace (Broekel and Boschma 2011). Spillovers between 
knowledge organizations and government contractors are facilitated through iterative processes 
of interaction rather than linear technology transfer. Traditional boundaries between 
organizations blur and “each actor should take the role of another, for example, knowledge 
organizations play a role as source of firm formation, and industry plays a role as developer of 
training and research” (Caniëls and Bosch 2010, 274).  
The setting of actors and linkages can be imperfect in CC-RISs (Tödtling and Trippl 2005). 
CC-RISs can lack relevant actors, a situation referred to as organizational thinness. The 
organizational set-up is weakly developed. Federal procurement is perceived as a supplier-
buyer interaction that does not require any support and intermediation functions. Thus, there 
are only a few organizations that are devoted to federal procurement. Moreover, CC-RISs can 
lack regional linkages and knowledge circulation, a situation referred to as fragmentation 
(Blažek et al. 2011). In this case, relevant actors of a CC-RIS exist, but they do not share ideas 
and knowledge.  
 
Spatial proximity & knowledge generation 
As many relevant actors in federal procurement are localized in the capital city, so are federal 
procurement knowledge dynamics. Most important, government contractors benefit from 
spatial proximity to federal agencies on the demand side. The development of government IT 
systems is a complex knowledge-intensive process that often results in intangible technologies 
such as software (Miles 2012). For the development of such systems, government contractors 
need to mobilize and combine codified and tacit knowledge that is embodied in both the 
contractor and client (Bettencourt et al. 2002; Landry, Amara, and Doloreux 2012). Spatial 
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proximity facilitates the mobilization of tacit knowledge through trusted relationships derived 
from repeated face-to-face interactions (Jones 2007). Moreover, face-to-face interactions 
enable government contractors to learn about the government client’s preferences and 
expectations.  
Aside from being close to government clients, government contractors benefit from spatial 
proximity to other CC-RIS actors (Landry, Amara, and Doloreux 2012). The thick endowment 
of CC-RISs with relevant federal procurement actors provides many opportunities for 
information and knowledge sharing. Spatial proximity facilitates flows of information through 
frequent, intended as well as unintended, face-to-face encounters. In this regard, the idea of 
local buzz (Bathelt et al. 2004; Storper and Veneblas 2004) is well incorporated in the RIS 
approach  (Doloreux and Parto 2005; Trippl and Tödtling 2011). Local buzz refers to regional 
circulation of “messages, information, news, rumours, gossip, and trade folklore” that actors 
automatically receive just from being there (Bathelt and Gräf 2008, 1947). As such, CC-RISs 
are unique places of constant federal procurement information flows.  
It is crucial for government contractors to transform such information flows into federal 
procurement knowledge. Federal procurement knowledge refers to the competence to position 
a firm at the federal marketplace. It requires absorptive capacity to tap into local information 
flows and to filter economically-useful information from the rest (Sternberg 2007; Trippl, 
Tödtling, and Lengauer 2009). In the generation of federal procurement knowledge, it is 
necessary for contractors to integrate various pieces of information and knowledge. This 
includes information about the unique regulatory procurement context and specific procedures 
such as procurement vehicles (Thai 2001). It includes knowledge about how procurement 
regulations unfold and shape procurement practices (Thai 2009). It includes client specific 
information such as preferences, budgets, schedules, and procurement plans (Aarikka-Stenroos 
and Jaakkola 2012). Finally, it includes project management competencies in the specific 
context of federal procurement which is often associated with risk-averse clients, culture of 
bureaucracy, and specific fiscal year-driven investment cycles (Boyne 2002). In federal 
procurement, the need to constantly gain and process federal procurement knowledge derives 
from the size of the contracts rather than high dynamics of the market. Since procurements of 
IT services are often bundled into large projects that are worth several million dollars, there are 
enormous business opportunities, but they do not occur so frequently.  
For the introduction of innovation, it is important to combine federal procurement knowledge 
with technical knowledge (Sammarra and Biggiero 2008). Tödtling and Grillitsch (2014) point 
out that most innovation studies provide a limited perspective on knowledge networks as they 
only focus on the generation and transfer of technical knowledge. Knowledge sources that 
government contractors use to acquire federal procurement knowledge differ in terms of 
geographic distribution from those that are used to acquire technical knowledge (Alberti and 
Pizzurno 2015). Exchange of federal procurement knowledge, on the one hand, is facilitated 
through spatial proximity because of constant information updates due to the local buzz effect. 
Technical knowledge, on the other hand, is exchanged with innovation partners who are located 
in greater geographical distances (Tödtling and Grillitsch 2014). 
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It should be recognized that while stressing the importance of knowledge flows within the 
capital city, a too narrow focus on regional knowledge sources can result in regional lock-in 
(Tödtling and Trippl 2005). CC-RIS actors are strongly oriented toward activities that take place 
within CC-RISs and ignore relevant external developments. They become “overembedded” as 
the selection process of innovation partners is biased toward previously successful regional 
partnerships (Woolthuis, Lankhuizen, and Gilsing 2005).     
Nevertheless, it is important to note that federal procurement implies distinct mechanisms that 
decrease the importance of spatial proximity in the supply-demand relationship (Thai 2009). 
First, spatial proximity does not play a role in reducing uncertainty about the quality of the 
outcome in federal procurement. Federal agencies select government contractors based on pre-
defined criteria (Bovis 2012). This is a very rationalized selection process that federal agencies 
need to be able to explain to unsuccessful bidders. A lack of transparency can cause lawsuits. 
In contrast, private market actors can try to reduce transaction costs through partner selections 
that are partially based on instinct, gut feelings, and trust (Scarso and Bolisani 2012). In this 
case, face-to-face interactions are a important mechanism in convincing other parties (Maskell, 
Bathelt, and Malmberg 2004). Second, federal agencies must publish federal business 
opportunities. Every government contractor has open access to such information. In contrast, 
private market actors communicate business opportunities in networks which are governed by 
trust (Glückler and Armbruster 2003). 
 
Diversification 
A major policy challenge for CC-RISs is to become less dependent on federal government 
spending – this is particularly relevant to secondary capital cities. If the regional economy is 
anchored in several different sectors, CC-RISs are more robust against downturns in federal 
procurement spending and job losses in one sector can be compensated for with job growth in 
other sectors. CC-RISs develop more independent regional economies through diversification 
(Aldrich 1999).  
Diversification relates to the ability to broaden the regional economy “into new applications 
and new sectors while building on their current knowledge base and competences” (Tödtling 
and Trippl 2013, 313). To explore how CC-RIS achieve the development of new application 
and new sectors, one need to look at how federal procurement enables government contractors 
to exploit their knowledge through new clients (Markusen 1994). The underlying ratio is that 
cumulative diversification activities of government contractors cause a change in the CC-RIS 
as a whole (Tödtling and Trippl 2013).  
At the government contractor level, government contractors become less dependent on a single 
federal agency by diversifying their client base (Greenwood et al. 2005). Government 
contractors translate knowledge generated in federal procurement projects into the context of 
new clients. This requires them to identify knowledge that might be relevant to other clients, 
extract it from client-specific contexts, and reconfigure it with preexisting internal knowledge 
(Strambach 2008). Castaldi and Giarratana (2011) note that the first step, the identification of 
knowledge that might be relevant to other clients, is a particular difficult step because 
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government contractors in IT services have “heterogeneous and sometimes scattered 
competences” and thus diversification is a deliberate and costly process (Castaldi and 
Giarratana 2011, 3).  
To trigger diversification of government contractors, federal procurement needs to enhance the 
government contractors’ knowledge stock (He and Wong 2009). Government contractors 
increase their knowledge stock if demand goes beyond state-of the art products and systems 
(Lember, Kalvet, and Kattel 2010). They engage in interactive learning processes to generate 
and acquire missing knowledge components. Since the federal agency is the first user of the 
respective service or product, the federal agency co-invests costs for interactive learning (Edler 
and Georghiou 2007). Government contractors learn about user experiences and further 
improve functionalities. As a result, government contractors can exploit the enhanced 
knowledge stock through new clients.    
Government contractors in IT are particularly well positioned for diversification. The 
development of IT services is a knowledge-intensive and costly process. But once a solution is 
developed, the replication is relatively straightforward and in fact many IT solutions include 
components that are “recycled” as they have been developed in the context of prior projects 
(Ibert 2004, 1530).  
 
Integrated framework  
It is important to pay attention to the relations between the four analytical categories in CC-RIS 
(federal innovation policies, actors and linkages, spatial proximity as well as knowledge 
generation, and diversification) (Edquist 2005). The arrangement of one category is likely to 
reinforce or discourage the arrangements of other categories. The complex interrelationships of 
CC-RIS can be specified as follows. 
First, we may expect correspondence between sophisticated federal procurement innovation 
policies and a strong endowment of intermediaries in CC-RISs. Federal procurement innovation 
policies are designed to stimulate knowledge interactions between public demand and private 
supply. Knowledge interactions are necessary to identify and discuss exact needs and possible 
solutions. The willingness of federal agencies to interact with government contractors leads to 
the emergence of intermediaries that coordinate and mediate interactions. Once intermediaries 
have emerged, they get involved in policy formulation and lobby for better use of innovation-
targeted instruments instead of the regular constrained federal procurement procedures. As 
such, they reinforce the correspondence between innovation policies and intermediaries. On the 
contrary, if federal procurement is neglected as a tool to stimulate innovation, strong 
intermediaries have not emerged yet. The lack of key intermediaries means that the CC-RIS is 
missing actors that drive change in federal procurement innovation policies. There is a weak 
endowment of actors that advocate on behalf of government contractors, that express problems 
in federal procurement practices, and that lobby for federal procurement policies that enable 
government contractors to innovate. 
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Source: Author’s analysis, inspired by Tödtling and Trippl (2005) 
Figure 1 Main structure of federal procurement driven CC-RIS  
 
Second, we may expect that the presence of intermediaries in CC-RISs increase the generation 
of technical knowledge. Government contractors generate technical knowledge if they face 
technically challenging demands, flexibility in solution development, and constant user-
producer interactions in the procurement process. Federal procurement projects are technically 
challenging particularly if federal agencies demand products and services that are not only new 
to the buying organization but new to the world (Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia 2012). PPI 
literature highlights that the success of such federal procurement projects depends on active 
intermediation between supply and demand (Rolfstam 2008). Edler and Yeow (2016), for 
example, note that intermediaries foster awareness about federal procurement projects and their 
technological opportunities in the government contractor community. Moreover, intermediaries 
help federal agencies to better understand private sector technologies, evaluate functional 
improvements, and assess technological options. In stimulating knowledge dynamics and 
facilitating collective interaction, “intermediaries are not so much brokers between distinct 
parties, but instruments to support systematic functions in innovation systems” (Edler and 
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Yeow 2016, 415). Thus, CC-RISs that deliver active intermediating functions provide a 
stimulating environment for government contractors to gain technical knowledge.  
Third, we may expect that the type of knowledge that the contractor gains in the interaction 
with a government client constraints the firm’s ability to diversify (Strambach 2008). Federal 
procurement knowledge, on the one hand, relates to the specific context of government clients. 
Thus, systematic generation of such knowledge increases the firm’s capacity to win new 
government clients. Since federal procurement knowledge can hardly be de-contextualized 
from the public sector, valorization of federal procurement is at the same time also limited to 
the context of government clients. There is no use of federal procurement knowledge outside 
this specific context. Technical knowledge, on the other hand, can be abstracted from the 
specific federal procurement context and recombined in other domains (Strambach and 
Dieterich 2011). Government contractors that generate technical knowledge increase their 
capacity to reconfigure and exploit their knowledge through private sector clients.    
 
3 Data and Methodology 
This study investigates federal-procurement driven CC-RISs that occur around federal 
agencies. To address this issue, this paper follows the design of a multiple-case study (Yin 
2009). The design is appropriate since one might expect to find differences between CC-RISs 
in several countries in terms of federal procurement policies, involved actors, knowledge 
dynamics, and diversification. Moreover, the multiple-case study design leads to robust 
findings (Stake 2006).  
The analysis draws on rich descriptions of four cases, namely Bern, The Hague1, Ottawa, and 
Washington, D.C. The four cities are interesting cases to study CC-RISs since their regional 
economy is dominated by capital city functions (Zimmermann 2010). While multi-functional 
capital cities such as London or Paris show higher national and international economic 
functions that are not related to hosting the federal government, secondary capital cities lack a 
more diversified economic base (Hall 2006). Thus, policymakers are expected to actively 
stimulate knowledge dynamics in CC-RISs to make the regional economy less dependent on 
the federal government. The study defines the boundaries of CC-RISs by drawing on statistical 
units that are based on the principle of regional economic integration.  Such a definition is 
beneficial as it cuts through political boundaries such as municipalities or states and displays 
economic realities (Romanelli and Feldman 2006).  
The research presented draws on 122 semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with key actors 
in CC-RIS. Interview partners were sampled using the snowball technique2 (Patton 1990). 
Initially, government contractors were identified using official federal procurement databases 
from each country for firms that a) deployed knowledge-intensive IT solutions to a government 
client and b) that are located in the capital city. Based on the assumption that contract volume 
                                                          
1 For the purpose of stylistic clarity, the term federal procurement is consistently used in the four case regions, 
although the Netherlands do not constitute as a federalization. 
2 In the case of Bern, government contractor interviewees were identified through social network analysis 
methods (see Paper No. 2) 
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positively corresponds to the complexity of IT government systems, contractors with the 
highest contract volume were contacted first. From there, the study snowballed to people and 
organizations that have repeatedly been pointed to as important actors in the CC-RIS (Patton 
1990). Since such an approach is biased toward very well connected CC-RIS actors, another 
point of departure has been academics in the field of regional economic development. 
Interviews lasted between 40 and 90 minutes for the most part and were typically conducted in 
meetings rooms but a few also took place in coffee shops because of limited facility access due 
to security requirements.  
Table 1 Overview of conducted interviews  
Category Bern The Hague Ottawa Washington, D.C. 
KIBS firms in federal procurement 12 10 20 10 
Regional development organizations 2 3 3 1 
University institutes 1 4 2 3 
Sector associations 0 2 2 4 
Federal procurement officials 1 2 2 2 
Regional policymakers 2 4 1 3 
Financial organizations 1 1 0 3 
Major employing firms other than KIBS 
firms 
4 2 2 0 
Law firms 0 1 1 1 
Others 2 2 3 3 
Total 25 31 36 30 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
 
4 Findings 
4.1 Bern 
Swiss federal procurement policies 
The federal procurement policy context in which Bern takes place is shaped by policies that try 
to increase competition between potential government contractors. Many initiatives in federal 
procurement try to harmonize the regulatory frameworks between different levels of 
government in order to reduce entrance barriers. However, federal procurement is not 
considered as a policy instrument that spurs innovations (Haldimann, Walter, and Brenzikofer 
2015). There are no formal mechanisms that stimulate knowledge sharing between public and 
private actors or that reward government officials for taking risks. 
An exception in this regard is the implementation of the competitive dialogue procedure into 
the Swiss federal procurement framework in 2010. Originally created by EU Public 
Procurement Directives in 2004, the competitive dialogue procedure is explicitly designed for 
demanding innovative IT systems. Compared to regular procurement procedures, the 
competitive dialogue procedure is more flexible in the ways in which it allows federal agencies 
and (potential) supplying government contractors to interact. As an outcome-based procedure, 
it specifies the need without limiting innovative solutions through detailed technical 
specifications. As expected, interviewees that were involved in the competitive dialogue 
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procedure regarded it as conducive for interactive learning. However, the federal government 
has used the competitive dialogue only a few times so far.   
 
Actors and linkages 
There are a couple of development organizations at the regional level that could facilitate the 
interaction between government contractors and federal agencies. Capital Region Switzerland 
(CRS, Hauptstadtregion Schweiz), for example, is dedicated to highlighting and enhancing the 
region’s role as a place where public and private sector interests are negotiated to benefit of 
Switzerland as a whole. CRS was founded in 2010 in direct response to an external shock: In 
the revision of the federal spatial concept, the Swiss Federal Office for Spatial Development 
designated Zurich, Basel and Geneva/Lausanne as economic engines whereas Bern was 
neglected in this regard. Covering a rather large perimeter, policy makers at the municipal and 
cantonal levels of government formed CRS to emphasize that the status of the greater region as 
a regular urban agglomeration is not content with the important political functions that the 
region provides. While having been politically successful (Kaufmann et al. 2016), CRS has not 
occupied a relevant position in stimulating communication between government contractors 
and federal agencies yet. In the same vein, semi-public regional development organizations and 
cluster managers advertise the seat of the federal government as a regional advantage but they 
do not provide significant bridging functions in this regard.  
Regarding the role of sector associations, there are only a few organizations and events that 
facilitate knowledge interactions between federal agencies and the government contractors’ 
community. Some government contractors considered that swissICT contributes to a federal 
procurement agenda that makes innovation possible (B16, B19, B23). The organization 
advocates for the use of agile software development in federal procurement. Reports and blogs 
illustrate advantages and disadvantages of certain procurement practices. SwissICT’s role can 
be described as providing knowledge inputs and promoting the issue of innovation in federal 
procurement more than providing network opportunities. While being headquartered in Zurich, 
swissICT’s federal procurement-related activities are mostly virtual but when they take place 
they occur in Bern. 
One of the few events where relevant actors in the field of IT federal procurement come together 
and discuss how federal procurement practices affect the issue of innovation is the “Conference 
for IT Procurement” (IT-Beschaffungskonferenz). The conference is an annual event co-
organized by the regional university, the federal IT steering unit, two sector associations, and a 
public sector organization that coordinates IT projects between different cantonal and federal 
levels of governments. The conference provides an opportunity to establish new contacts, share 
experiences, and exchange best practices. 
In general, the knowledge support system seems to be important in providing education but 
unimportant in providing contract research and technology transfer for government contractors. 
Many government contractors find it difficult to find new employees that are qualified in IT 
and stressed the importance of university programs that address this issue. For particular federal 
procurement projects, interviewees reported neither an example where the supplying firm 
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cooperated with a university nor an example where the supplying firm commercialized research 
outcomes. Government contractors seem to not depend on the kind of knowledge that 
universities supply in research collaboration.  
The examples of intermediation remain single activities. Bern’s CC-RIS can be characterized 
as organizationally thin in the context of federal procurement. From a government contractor’ 
perspective, there are relatively few private and public sector organizations that get involved in 
innovation policy formulation in federal procurement, bring forward perceived barriers, lobby 
for mutual interest, or address practices that hinder innovation. Moreover, there is no relevant 
organization that initiates a larger debate about what challenges federal agencies are facing, 
technologies they are looking at, and private sector technologies could be adopted to federal 
agencies’ needs or vice versa. 
Government contractors have trusted one-on-one relationships with government officials.  
Almost all government contractors reported that they do not submit a proposal if they hear a 
federal business opportunity through the central database for the first time. Several individuals 
stated that they have been involved in federal procurement for decades and have developed 
strong personal relationships with government officials (B19, B20, B24). As federal 
procurement information is largely communicated through trusted one-on-one relationships that 
are developed through repeated interactions, it is difficult and costly for new firms to gain 
federal procurement knowledge and to enter the federal marketplace. Arguably, Bern’s CC-RIS 
is threatened by lock-in.        
 
Spatial proximity and types of knowledge 
Government contractors primarily benefit from spatial proximity to their government clients in 
acquiring federal procurement knowledge as opposed to technical knowledge. Government 
contractors try to get as much face-time as possible with government officials in order to create 
trusted relationships. They try to supplement formal meetings by adding informal meetings over 
lunch or coffee. Government contractors get an understanding of what challenges the particular 
federal agency is facing and what their requirements and preferences are. Government 
contractors try to shape the request for proposals by advertising what a good solution might 
look like. These are constant conversations before the procurement process even has started yet. 
On the contrary, once the procurement procedure has started many technical decisions have 
already been made. So it is through informal, face-to-face meetings that take place before a 
request for proposal is published, when contractors and federal agencies exchange ideas.  
In terms of technical knowledge, federal procurement provides a difficult environment. The 
Swiss federal government mainly uses regular procurement procedures for demanding goods 
and services, including complex government IT systems. In regular procurement procedures, 
there is little room for experimentation. The process of service or product development is 
described in detail and pre-defined outputs of one stage lead to the next stage and so on. As 
such, this is a rather rigid process that disregards new ideas and alternative solutions and thus 
is not conducive for generating technical knowledge.  
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Government contractors benefit from being located in Bern mostly through co-location with 
federal agencies as opposed to co-location with additional CC-RIS actors. As the CC-RIS is not 
shaped toward federal procurement activities, government contractors are weakly integrated 
into the wider CC-RIS.  
 
Diversification 
Government contractors in Bern stated that there are limited opportunities to generate new 
technical knowledge in federal procurement projects. The constraining federal procurement 
framework gives very little room for alternative solutions and - from the suppliers’ perspective 
-  government officials do not appreciate new ideas. Thus, diversification through exploitation 
of technical knowledge barely takes place.  
Nevertheless, government contractors benefit in terms of diversification through an enhanced 
reputation derived from federal procurement projects. Reputation is an important mechanism 
that facilitates the diversification of a government contractor’s client base. In particular, it is 
beneficial for winning new government clients because governments clients attach great 
importance to whether a firm has provided a similar service to another government client 
before. In addition to price, references help to set them apart from competitors. Multi-national 
government contractors tap into firm-internal databases and see whether they have done 
something similar for another government client around the world. The interviewees indicated 
that international references are more often leveraged for Swiss government clients than the 
other way around (B19, B24). Thus, government contractors primarily diversify their client 
base through other Swiss government clients. Government contractors become less dependent 
on single federal agency through new government clients. Nevertheless, the region as a whole 
does not become less dependent on federal procurement spending. 
Moreover, an enhanced reputation derived from federal procurement projects is helpful in 
winning new private sector clients. References coming from government clients are specific as 
the federal government is expected to be an objective player. This means federal agencies are 
not expected to give any complimentary references as opposed to private sector clients. Thus, 
a good reference from a federal agency is perceived as trustworthy information that signals 
competences to potential private sector clients. It is in particular SMEs that benefit from an 
enhanced reputation as they lack other signals of competencies such as a well-known firm brand 
or a prime location within the city center.  
In summary, the case of Bern illustrates a CC-RIS that is characterized by a rather weak 
endowment of intermediary actors but strong personal relationships between contractors and 
government officials. Government contractors act individually and try to build many one-on-
one meetings with government officials from several agencies. Since inter-firm networks are 
not considerably formalized and have not led to the emergence of strong associations that speak 
on behalf of the government contractor community, a considerable engine for change in federal 
procurement innovation policies is absent. Benefits of spatial proximity are largely limited to 
co-location of federal agencies.  
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4.2 Ottawa 
Canadian federal procurement policies 
As of recently, Canada’s federal government has identified federal procurement as a vehicle to 
stimulate innovation. An important program in this regard is the Build in Canada Innovation 
Program (BCIP) which encourages federal agencies to become first purchasers of private sector 
innovations. Starting as a pilot in 2010, Canada’s federal procurement arm Public Works and 
Government Services Canada (PWGSC) released the program to close the gap between pre-
commercial innovations and the market place. Federal agencies take the risk of being the first 
user and give detailed feedback to enable government contractors to further improve the service 
or product. After a period of five years, federal agencies have awarded 183 contracts to 
innovative projects (O6). 
Among the many contract vehicles that federal agencies use to procure IT services, Solutions-
Based Informatics Professional Services (SBIPS) is one that provides the flexibility that is 
associated with innovation. SBIPS defines the functions that a solution must fulfill but does not 
describe the product itself. So it creates an incentive for government contractors to look for new 
ways to develop a more efficient solution. 
The interaction between supply and demand was further improved through the implementation 
of “smart procurement”. The procedure was developed for major transformations such as when 
the federal government transforms their e-mail system. It includes many steps in the early 
phases before the request for proposals is published to ensure that government contractors gain 
intelligence about what exactly is needed and that government officials gain intelligence about 
what solutions are feasible. Additional steps include, for example, industry days, informal 
discussions, focus groups, one-on-one consultations, and request for information.  
In 2006, the Canadian government established the Office of Small and Medium Enterprises 
(OSME) to promote participation of SMEs in federal procurement. OSME informs SMEs about 
procurement regulations and procedures and puts them in touch with purchasing agencies. As 
part of the central federal procurement agency, OSME also directly addresses procurement 
practices that discriminate against SMEs. Nevertheless, since SMEs are defined as firms with 
up to 500 employees, critical voices have been raised saying that the range of represented firms 
is too wide and is associated with conflicting interests in federal procurement. 
 
Actors and linkages 
Partner firms constitute an important group of Ottawa’s CC-RIS both in terms of federal 
procurement knowledge and technical knowledge. There are many procurement practices that 
facilitate cooperation among government contractors specifically between SMEs and large 
government contractors. Federal agencies encourage SMEs to partner with large firms to ensure 
large project capacity. Since SMEs consider the preparation of proposals time and cost 
intensive, they partner in order to share the risk of unsuccessful bidding. One of the selection 
criteria is whether a government contractor can demonstrate a good track record. So SMEs often 
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compensate for missing track records by partnering with government contractors that can 
provide the required information.      
In the search for suitable partner firms, national sector associations play an important role. They 
provide many opportunities for initiating and maintaining relationships with other government 
contractors through social network events, member meetings, podium discussions, and guest 
speaker presentations. Moreover, associations coordinate federal procurement practices with 
private market knowledge. An example is the Information Technology Infrastructure 
Roundtable where associations and government officials discuss how certain federal 
procurement practices affect the development of IT systems. About three times a year they hold 
advisory meetings where sector associations’ representatives get together with government 
officials from the end-client agencies, Shared Services Canada (central IT government agency), 
and PWGSC (central procurement arm). At these meetings, they discuss the progress or lack of 
progress in moving toward proper federal procurement reforms. This includes issues such as 
how the government should roll out procurement for major transformational initiatives or how 
they should use the limitation of liability within procurements.  
Semi-public organizations have a strong tradition in fostering regional cooperation and 
networking in Ottawa. Most important, the Ottawa Centre for Research and Innovation (OCRI) 
was founded to facilitate knowledge interactions among private and public actors across the 
region in 1983. Initially founded by 14 organizations such as local universities, municipality, 
high-tech firms, and federal research laboratories, OCRI consistently grew and by 1998 they 
had reached 400 member organizations and 50 employees (Wilson 1999). Several studies that 
analyzed knowledge dynamics in Ottawa acknowledged OCRI as an important facilitator of 
cooperation (Doloreux 2004; Gordon 2015; Wolfe 2002). The crash of the internet bubble in 
2001 and the financial crisis in 2008 hit the region dramatically and much of the talent left the 
region (Spigel 2011). Knowledge dynamics and regional cooperation dramatically dropped 
during this period of time (O16). To revitalize the regional economy, OCRI was relaunched 
under the new name “Invest Ottawa” in 2012. 
Activities of Invest Ottawa are weakly linked to government contractors. The organization 
focuses more on providing start-ups with support services, branding the city as an 
entrepreneurial place, and attracting international investments. One of the few attempts of 
Invest Ottawa to stimulate knowledge dynamics in the government contractors’ community is 
through an online database that shows federal business opportunities. In cooperation with the 
Economic Development and Innovation Department at the City of Ottawa, Invest Ottawa 
collects federal business opportunities from various state and national procurement databases 
in Canada and the USA. Designed to grow the regional economy, Invest Ottawa’s database only 
shows federal business opportunities that match their regional clusters such as software 
development, wireless technologies, and security networks.  
Ottawa’s strong knowledge support subsystem, plays a minor role as an innovation partner in 
the context of federal procurement. Linked to the city’s status as the capital city, Ottawa hosts 
44 federal research laboratories. In addition, there are two universities, University of Ottawa 
and Carleton University, that have a strong research focus. Particularly the latter puts much 
emphasis on creating knowledge in the fields of software engineering, network security, and 
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pervasive computing. Carleton Computer Security Lab, for example, conducts research about 
security issues in networked information systems and illustrates that the knowledge support 
subsystem can be considered to correspond to the needs of government contractors. 
Nevertheless, government contractors did not regarded the knowledge subsystem as relevant to 
technical and federal procurement knowledge. Regional policymakers show awareness of the 
absence of links between federal research laboratories and the CC-RIS. It is a policy goal to 
better take advantage of federal research laboratories in terms of commercialization (O9), but 
this has not led to powerful instruments or initiatives yet.  
A possible explanation for the absence of linkages between government contractors and 
knowledge organizations can be the character of federal procurement projects. Interviews 
indicate that federal procurement projects are often not very sophisticated in terms of technical 
knowledge. As the complexity of projects arises from bureaucratic environments rather than 
from technical requirements, government contractors do not heavily rely on cutting-edge 
research that is provided by federal research laboratories. However, the two universities are 
important in providing human capital. Some government contractors stated that part of their 
workforce graduated from the regional universities and students often stay in the region because 
of the high quality of life.     
 
Spatial proximity and knowledge generation 
Government contractors considered the location in the CC-RIS as crucial for their success in 
federal procurement. One reason is that government clients use spatial proximity to achieve a 
time advantage in the federal procurement process. They constantly interact with government 
officials to know about potential procurement projects as early as possible. As soon as they 
know about procurement plans they start to search for partners. Government contractors try to 
condition the federal agency to look for a certain kind of solution in informal and formal 
meetings. One interviewee explained: “If you are sitting there and wait for requests for 
proposals to suit your solution, then you are going to die. You have to be out there cultivating 
the need that creates the requirements.” (O30). Another reason why spatial proximity is 
important is that there are many people involved on the client side, and government contractors 
have to maintain many personal relationships. Knowledge and decision-making power about 
fiscal budgets, IT infrastructure, legal aspects, priorities, end-user preferences, and federal 
procurement strategies are distributed on many people from different federal agencies. 
Government contractors invest much time and money in relationship building and face-to-face 
meetings are important factors in deepening such relationships. Finally, government contractors 
benefit from spatial proximity in the actual development of the service. Government IT systems 
can often only be accessed from the client side due to security issues. Ongoing federal 
procurement projects also provide a good opportunity to learn about future federal procurement 
projects.  
In addition, government contractors benefit from spatial proximity to partner firms. Since many 
government contractors are concentrated in the downtown business district next to Parliament 
Hill, there are many opportunities to have an “ear to the wall to see what everybody is doing” 
(O31). One mechanism that puts much emphasis on the geographical level in searching for 
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partner firms is the requirement of security clearance. Government contractors that are involved 
in the provision of federal government IT systems largely interact with federal agencies in the 
field of defense and security. Therefore, government contractors are required to hold security 
clearances at the employee level. While pretty much all specialized government contractors in 
CC-RIS are equipped with the required forms, firms that are not specialized in federal 
procurement mainly lack security clearance. As a result, government contractors seek partner 
firms mainly at the regional level. 
The strong localization of federal procurement activities may cause regional lock-in to some 
extent. For example, one interviewee noted that “it tends to be a very incestuous pool of people 
that just keep moving around and around and around” (O23). In the same vein, another 
interviewee noted that Ottawa is a “very small town in terms of IT. Everyone knows everyone 
and it’s the same individuals who are always rotating through the different jobs” (O27). While 
the interviews indicated that extra-firm linkages are highly localized, intra-firm linkages are 
more global. Many government contractors are multi-branch firms. They use intra-firm linkages 
to channel knowledge to its place of demand on regional, national and international levels.  
  
Diversification 
Most government contractor interviewees traced the question of diversification back to the ways 
in which the federal government procures. The use of solution-based procurements (e.g. 
SBIPS), specific innovation-oriented instruments, and open dialogues between government 
contractors and federal agencies enable firms to generate knowledge and technologies that can 
be commercialized in other markets. To give but one example, an Ottawa-grown firm that 
participated in BCIP developed a cybersecurity platform that empowered them to win new 
private sector clients nationally and internationally. The Ottawa firm had been developing 
security solutions for federal agencies for over two decades. Due to their knowledge and 
experience in federal procurement, the firm identified a need for a medium assurance system. 
Information had been either not protected or had high assurance, which is expensive. The firm 
came up with an idea of how to develop a medium assurance software solution. As a first contact 
partner, the firm shared their idea with OSME who had been open to the idea and supported the 
development of a proof of concept with 200.000 CAD. As part of BCIP, OSME linked the firm 
to a federal agency that procured that technology solution. Having a first client, the firm turned 
the proof of concept into a prototype and finally into a product. Today the product generates 
more revenue than any of the firm’s other products. While the process of developing the 
knowledge-intensive product has taken place in the context of federal procurement, the firm 
was able to diversify their client base by reselling the product to major technology firms in 
Canada, the USA, the UK, and Mexico.  
On the contrary, the use of time-based procedures and narrow technical specifications creates 
few incentives to innovate and little knowledge is gained that can be exploited through private 
sector clients. In this light, it seems rather problematic that most government contractors 
described an increasing use of federal agencies to procure through time-based procedures. For 
federal agencies, the use of time-based procedures is much easier to handle since they do not 
need to figure out what exactly they are looking for but can use predefined templates. Thus, 
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government contractors mainly generate federal procurement knowledge that creates 
competitive advantages in winning new Canadian government clients. 
In summary, the case of Ottawa illustrates a CC-RIS in which federal agencies increasingly 
facilitate knowledge dynamics through federal procurement instruments that are dedicated to 
innovation. Many government IT system components are developed in teams of partnering 
government contractors. Therefore, government contractors benefit from being located in 
Ottawa not only through co-location with federal agencies but also through localized interactive 
processes with other government contractors. At the interface between federal agencies and 
government contractor, national sector associations foster knowledge sharing. 
 
4.3 The Hague 
Dutch federal procurement policies 
The Dutch government shows clear awareness of the potential to stimulate innovation through 
federal procurement. It becomes most apparent when looking at the main procurement agency, 
that is Professional and Innovative Tendering Network for Government Contracting Authorities 
(PIANOo). About half of PIANOo’s workforce is dedicated to find ways in which procurement 
regulations and practices can enable innovative solutions (TH18). PIANOo accelerates the use 
of outcome-based specifications and interactive behavior of government officials. However, 
Dutch federal procurement is highly decentralized and every federal agency is responsible for 
their own purchases. Thus, PIANOo’s capability to leverage purchasing power is limited to 
providing consultancy to federal agencies.  
The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program is a prime example of how the Dutch 
government uses pre-commercial procurement to stimulate technical innovation. Inspired by 
how the U.S. government uses programs to leverage federal procurement power, the Dutch 
government created their own in 2005. Up to 2012, seven federal agencies had used SBIR and 
have awarded 650 contracts (Ministry of Economic Affairs 2014). Based on a need that a federal 
agency faces, firms can propose a solution. While the need is very clear, there are no technical 
specifications and firms can submit any solution regardless of underlying technologies. Based 
on pre-defined criteria, a small group of firms are awarded a contract to conduct a feasibility 
study of their innovative solutions. During the next step, the most promising solutions receive 
a research and development contract. As soon as a prototype exists, federal agencies have the 
opportunity to procure the outcome of this process and become the first user of that technology. 
As an early adopter of that technology, federal agencies encourage other users to follow. 
Finally, firms can start to commercialize their product with other clients in the public and 
private sector. To ensure compliance with the regulatory framework, Dutch SBIR is neither 
limited to SMEs nor to national firms, which differs to the U.S. case.       
 
Actors and linkages 
Federal procurement driven knowledge interactions primarily take place within the field of 
security. The municipality of The Hague is one of the main actors that foster knowledge 
 21 
 
generation in the security sector. The most important initiative in this regard is The Hague 
Security Delta (HSD). Thus, the question of what actors are involved and what role they play 
becomes most apparent when looking at the development of HSD.   
Although there has been a strong concentration of security firms in the region, the municipality 
failed to develop the security cluster for a long time. Interviewees reported a tendency of the 
municipality to treat the field of security as part of the field of justice (TH7, TH9). As such, the 
municipality primarily focused on lawyers, and other legal service providers but refrained from 
stimulating technology-based entrepreneurship in security. Interviewees indicated that the lack 
of the municipality’s recognition of security as a sector with peculiarities was also reflected in 
the city branding. When the municipality launched a new slogan, the involved actors came up 
with the idea “The Hague - City of Peace, Justice and Security”.  However, the municipality 
felt no need to include security and cut the word “security” from their slogan.  
In 2010, the city was increasingly challenged to implement new initiatives that were supposed 
to develop the regional economy. The Hague faced a decline of jobs in the public sector, as well 
as in the telecommunications sector, and saw a stagnation in the oil industry. To identify the 
economic potential of the region, the municipality launched a study and found that the regional 
innovation capacity could be increased through stimulation of knowledge dynamics in security. 
The study pointed to the fact that The Hague hosts many relevant actors in security at different 
levels of governments. Despite the presence of relevant security actors, there was no venue for 
contractors, researchers, procurement officials, or regional economic developers to meet and 
share ideas. One interviewee of a think tank described that the linkages between relevant actors 
in security were almost non-existent and noted that “actors were just like grains of sand, they 
were not glued together” (TH7). 
In response, the municipality launched The Hague Security Delta (HSD) to link relevant actors 
and to take more advantage of the presence of federal agencies. HSD is a cluster organization 
that facilitates knowledge dynamics, provides research infrastructure, and coordinates projects 
in the field of security. To ensure that the organization meets different requirements from 
various actors, the municipality launched HSD as a public-private partnership. Co-founders 
included major government contractors (i.e. Thales, Siemens), federal agencies (i.e. Ministry 
of Security and Justice), and knowledge organizations (i.e. TU Delft, TNO). In the first three 
years, the municipality’s 5 million euro investment has leveraged additional funds from the 
federal government and network partners as well as 1.5 million euro from the European 
Regional Development Fund (TH9). HSD facilitates knowledge dynamics by providing 
physical space where different security actors meet, the so called HSD Campus. There are many 
shared facilities such as living labs, classrooms, flexible office spaces, meeting rooms.  
One important way in which HSD adds value to the location is that HSD coordinates public 
demand and private supply. For example, HSD coordinated the National Innovation Agenda 
for Security 2015 (NIAS). It is an agenda that aligns R&D projects of government contractors 
and knowledge organizations with requirements of federal agencies. HSD invited all relevant 
stakeholders to identify and discuss the main challenges and developments in security that they 
projected would be important over the next couple of years. At the federal level, the Ministry 
of Security and Justice and the Ministry of Defense have been involved in the process. As a 
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result, 16 key innovation focus areas were identified in the report. In these areas, the agenda 
intends to give government contractors some reliability for investments in R&D since they can 
better predict what the federal agencies are going to need in the near future. HSD links NIAS 
with the procurement agenda of several federal agencies. As a result, federal government 
contractors get an idea of how much and what federal agencies are going to buy in the next 
couple of years. In brief, HSD allows government contractors to match their innovation 
activities with the future demand of federal agencies.    
The Hague’s knowledge organizations can be divided into two groups based on the roles that 
they play in the CC-RIS. On the one hand, there are organizations that supply technical 
knowledge. For example, Netherlands Organization of Applied Scientific Research (TNO) is 
devoted to provide technical expertise in defense and security as well as other government-
dominated industries such as urbanization, energy, and health. As a consequence of the 
specialization in this intersection, some interviewees mentioned that TNO is better prepared to 
manage projects in which federal agencies are involved. Such projects can unfold their own 
dynamics that differ from purely private sector projects. For example, government officials may 
face restrictions about what items they can spent their budgets on, what data validation 
processes is required, or information they can disclose.  
On the other hand, there is a group of knowledge organizations that provide expertise that is 
needed in developing a more general understanding of societal and administrative trends in the 
field of security. For example, The Hague Center for Strategic Studies (HCSS) is a think tank 
that focuses on temporary global crisis from a policy point of view. HCSS emerged out of a 
project in which also TNO, Clingendeal (a think tank in the field of international relations that 
is also located in The Hague) and the Ministry of Defense were involved. Large international 
system integrators benefit from HCSS by receiving advice about their business strategies and 
how to generally position themselves for future challenges.  
What both groups of organizations have in common is that they explicitly focus on the 
intersection between federal agencies and government contractors. They act as an important 
link not only between federal agencies and contractors but also between university institutes 
and other research organizations. In addition, they link regional with extra-regional actors 
because they are very well connected with international security communities. Even 
interviewees from contracting firms who did not tap into the available knowledge, highlighted 
that these organizations nevertheless are important as they brand the region as a knowledge hub 
for security (TH24, TH31).  
 
Spatial proximity and knowledge generation 
Government contractors indicated that they benefit from being located in The Hague 
particularly in those projects that are dedicated to innovation. The sophisticated demand in such 
projects fosters localized interactive learning processes between government contractors and 
federal agencies. “CSI The Hague” is an example of a project that were dedicated to innovation 
and that was realized through pre-commercial procurement. The project was initiated by the 
Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI), an agency of the Ministry of Justice, in 2009. The 
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Municipality of The Hague and the Ministry of Economic Affairs co-financed the five million 
euros project costs. The idea was to develop technology that enables NFI investigators to 
digitize and visualize a crime scene. NFI drove innovation dynamics from the demand side by 
describing the government contractors what exactly the needs are without predefining possible 
solutions. A consortium of 9 government contractors and 4 knowledge organizations developed 
and re-combined technologies from different domains in order to meet NFI’s needs. While the 
project involved not only government contractors from The Hague but different parts of the 
Netherlands, much of the work required face-to-face interaction that took place in The Hague. 
In the beginning of the project, NFI gave several seminars that aimed to develop a common 
understanding about the domain of forensic in general and the project requirements in 
particular. During the development of the project, much of the work took place in the CSI 
laboratory which is a facility that was particularly created for the CSI The Hague project and is 
located next to the NFI building. A The Hague-based government contractor that developed the 
stimulation software for this project noted that the CSI laboratory was the central place for all 
consortium members to meet and spin ideas (TH29). Along the line, a program manager of NFI 
noted that: 
 “CSI laboratory was where all companies came with their technology, so you get a very 
innovative place where people inspire each other, where you are celebrating new things, and 
if there are problems, you were also there to fight with each other. It was a very, very tense 
environment where people are creative” (TH22) 
In regular federal procurement, a similar picture emerged like in the other case study regions: 
Government contractors benefit from being located in the capital city primarily through 
generating federal procurement knowledge. There are many occasions when government 
contractors learn about federal business opportunities and start to interact with purchasing 
agencies. For generating technical knowledge, however, the regular procurement process gives 
very little flexibility since overly detailed pre-defined requirements limit the possibilities for 
alternative ideas.   
 
Diversification 
HSD is an initiative that explicitly aims to diversify the regional economy. Ever since the 
foundation, the municipality emphasized that an innovation system in security has great 
potential for firms to win new clients in the private sector (TH20). The main argument is that 
security has traditionally been a topic that the federal government has to deal with. So there is 
some knowledge and experience pooled not only in federal agencies but also in contractors that 
have co-produced security systems. Since (cyber-)security has become increasingly important 
for firms, they are more willing to spent their budgets on security. Thus, government contractors 
that have gained security knowledge through interactive learning with federal agencies have 
great potential to exploit their knowledge in the interaction with private sector clients.   HSD is 
a recent initiative and has yet to materialize and noticeably impact the regional economy. 
Nevertheless, in the first three years, more than 500 new jobs in the field of security have been 
created and 18 firms have re-located from other regions to The Hague (TH9). 
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At the firm level, interviews suggest that government contractors exploit knowledge derived 
from federal procurement to a large extent through international agencies. The Hague clearly 
has a strong regional advantage in hosting international security agencies. Examples include 
Europol, European Cybercrime Centre, NATO Communications and Information Agency, 
Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum, and European Air Transport Command. Europol, for 
example, is a member organization of HSD and flourishes the regional security network. To the 
extent that international agencies are part of regional networks, it makes it easier for 
government contractors to approach international agencies and to collaborate.    
Nevertheless, there are also several cases in which government contractors were able to exploit 
knowledge through private sector clients. To give but one example, in 1999, two employees of 
the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI) who dealt with digital forensic and cybersecurity left 
NFI to start a firm. While NFI was at the forefront in cybersecurity, the private sector was not 
concerned with this topic. In addition to winning Dutch government clients, the firm was 
successful in exploiting their knowledge through international agencies and private sector 
clients. Yet, it was only in recent years that the increasing demand of security services in the 
private sector boosted the development of the firm (O23). They diversified into markets that 
deal with highly sensitive data and won clients such as banks, telecommunication firms, as well 
as multi-national law firms and therefore grew to 240 employees. 
In summary, CC-RIS in The Hague is characterized by high knowledge dynamics in the field 
of security. Despite the lack of an outstanding federal procurement budget, The Hague 
increased its innovation capacity by fostering knowledge exchanges between public demand 
and private supply. It was a proactive municipality that fostered the emergence of a dynamic 
security cluster by acting as a connecting link between federal agencies, government 
contractors, and specialized knowledge organizations.  
 
4.4 Washington, D.C. 
U.S. federal procurement policies 
The link between federal procurement and innovation is very strong. There are several 
initiatives and instruments that aim to leverage federal procurement for innovation. The Small 
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program is the prime example of how R&D funding and 
public demand are combined as a powerful instrument that catalyzes innovation activities in 
small firms (see e.g. Feldman, Francis, and Bercovitz 2005; Keller and Block 2013). Moreover, 
there have been considerable initiatives to create a collaborative environment for federal 
agencies and government contractors. For example, in 2009, the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy noted that many procurement officials had become uncertain about how to interact with 
contractors in the field of IT. Increasing uncertainty was mainly caused by the shift of 
purchasing products to purchasing complex services that took place over the last decade. As 
purchasing activities became more complex, procurement officials became more reluctant and 
increasingly risk-averse. They were afraid of causing legal proceedings against them and often 
neglected to interact with IT government contractors (W4). To re-establish a collaborative 
culture, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy initiated the “myth busting” memorandum in 
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2011. The memorandum explicitly encouraged government officials to interact with 
contractors, initiated training of the government officials, and addressed barriers that needed to 
be removed to further improve the interaction.  
The U.S. federal government strongly facilitates participation of SMEs in federal procurement. 
The most effective way of doing this is by reserving federal business opportunities for SMEs, 
so called set-asides. The U.S. government aims that at least 23% of the annual federal 
procurement budget goes to SMEs. In this regard, only contracts in which SMEs act as prime 
contractors are taken into account so that the actual participation is much higher. In addition, 
federal agencies give SMEs preferential treatment by handling the price of a SME’s bid lower 
than the price technically is. Moreover, federal agencies remove barriers for SMEs in federal 
procurement by “unbundling” large procurements into smaller ones and by providing trainings 
about regulations and procedures. Moreover, there are formal protegee programs that encourage 
large firms to mentor SMEs. Large firms then get funding for their time and effort in building 
relationships with SMEs.  
 
Actors and linkages 
Partner government contractors play an important role in circulating knowledge. The interviews 
indicate that government contractors partner with other firms in most of the federal procurement 
projects. For example, government contractors partner with minority-owned businesses to 
increase the chances of being awarded a contract since federal agencies need to meet certain 
minority participation goals. Government contractors constantly acquire knowledge from 
partner firms in federal procurement projects. During the projects, they also share knowledge 
beyond the scope of a particular project and become important sources of federal procurement 
knowledge and technical knowledge for each other. The managing of partnerships is therefore 
a critical task for government contractors. They need to acquire knowledge from partner firms 
to constantly update what developments take place in the federal marketplace. Yet, they need 
to protect their own knowledge to secure their competitive advantages (Jiang et al. 2016). 
Partner activities create unique processes of knowledge circulation in Washington, D.C. One 
interviewee explained “It has this weird ecosystem where you and I could be competing this 
morning on one opportunity. We could be teaming this afternoon on another opportunity. And 
tomorrow you might be trying to buy me” (W15). Many interviewees highlighted that no 
aggressive rivalry occur between two or three major firms in Washington, D.C. On the contrary, 
federal procurement creates complex partnerships in which competition takes place in a more 
subtle and covert manner. As one interviewee explained: “In this town, you have to learn to 
take ‘no’ for an answer, … it is, of course, a competitive town, but somebody will be your 
opponent today, it’s just as likely he could be your ally tomorrow” (W13). 
Public and semi-public regional development organizations facilitate the interaction between 
government contractors and federal agencies. Since the national capital region spans over 17 
counties and six independent cities, there are many development organizations. Their activities 
are tailored to the type of government contractors they host. Arlington, for example, is a county 
that is dominated by the homeland security industry (Mayer and Cowell 2014). The regional 
development agency, Arlington Economic Development, therefore tries to grow their business 
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community by matchmaking  government contractors with federal agencies in the field of 
security such as DARPA or DHS (W14). A good example in this regard is the Tandem National 
Security Innovations (TandemNSI) program. The program provides a platform for innovative 
firms to showcase their solutions to security challenges. They bring innovative firms together 
with program managers of the relevant federal agencies, allowing them to connect personally. 
Moreover, federal agencies visit TandemNSI events to present security challenges that they are 
facing and to establish good relationships with firms that have potential solutions.           
In Washington, D.C., there is an abundance of national sector associations that act as knowledge 
mediators between federal agencies and member firms. One of the most important associations 
in the context of government IT systems is the Professional Service Council (PSC). Founded in 
1972, PSC grew to about 390 IT service firm members which all are active in federal 
procurement and many of them are located in the capital city region in 2015. One key theme of 
PSC is to address issues in which the procurement practices do not keep pace with changes in 
the demand structure. While the demand structure experienced a shift from buying products to 
acquiring services and thus require different practices and capabilities (Gordon 2012), the 
procurement practices and trainings of the government officials did not change in many areas. 
PSC addresses resulting problems from the suppliers’ perspective and discusses them with 
acquisition policy leaders. This includes close collaboration with the General Service 
Administration (GSA) which is an independent agency that advises other federal agencies in 
how to purchase products and services. In order to get more attention and strength, PSC 
coordinates some of their activities with the “Acquisition Reform Working Group” (ARWG). 
ARWG is a group of eight national sector association that all exclusively deal with federal 
procurement.   
When it comes to very large procurements, federal agencies also use large national sector 
associations to tap into market knowledge before entering the tendering process (W18). 
Government officials present how they plan to procure a specific service in front of member 
firms. Government officials present timelines and answer what they understand to be industry 
concerns about that procurement. During the following ten days, member firms discuss 
feasibility and advantages as well as disadvantages of how the federal agency plans to procure. 
After obtaining the views of the member firms, the association puts together a set of 
recommendations for the purchasing agency. Some weeks later, the government officials come 
back to the association’s office and respond to the recommendations.  
Knowledge organizations are well shaped and linked to federal procurement. The Basic 
Research Innovation and Collaboration Center (BRICC) is a good example of correspondence 
of knowledge organizations and other parts of the CC-RIS. BRICC is a non-for profit 
corporation of the Virginia Tech Research Center in Arlington. As part of a Partnership 
Intermediary Agreement (PIA) with the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, they are 
explicitly dedicated to creating knowledge spillovers between knowledge organizations, 
government contractors, and federal agencies. Specifically, BRICC plays three roles. They 
identify technologies in federal agencies that could be useful for government contractors, they 
identify technologies in the government contractor sector that could be useful for federal 
agencies and they facilitate joint research projects. Thus, a major challenge for BRICC is how 
to identify technologies that could unleash innovation through application in new contexts. To 
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address this question, BRICC started a series of events where program managers from DARPA, 
NIH, NSF, Air Force and many more agencies shared experiences. Thus, BRICC has act as a 
platform to enhance knowledge sharing.   
 
Spatial proximity and knowledge generation 
Government contractors stressed the importance of face-to-face interactions with federal 
agencies in all but one stage of the procurement process in case of multi-million dollar projects. 
In the beginning, informal meetings are used to exchange ideas and to gain an understanding of 
“what keeps the federal agency up at night” (W29). Such informal meetings include lunch and 
coffee meetings. The conversations eventually become more specific about particular needs and 
requirements. Government contractors try to steer discussions toward specific opportunities and 
how the government contractor could be of service to that opportunity. Such meetings are 
formal and often held in offices of federal agencies. If government contractors want to showcase 
new technologies, they also invite government officials to their side. At this stage, government 
contractors start to search for potential partner firms. Face-to-face meetings allow them to 
assess “how badly” the other firm wants to be their partner (W25). Due to trusted relationships, 
they also share gossip about what teams are chasing the same opportunity. Government 
contractors then try to shape the request for proposals in their favor and position themselves. 
On the government contractor’s side, such conversations include team members with 
backgrounds from multiple disciplines. Teams include “deal shapers” that know very well how 
the client ticks, program managers, solution architects, computer programmers, technology 
consultants, lawyers, and business administrators. There is typically a counterpart for each of 
the team positions on the government client’s side.  
The composition of teams shows that both federal procurement knowledge as well as technical 
knowledge is exchanged during these formal and informal meetings. Although no contract has 
been awarded, government contractors start to search for potential solutions. Solution architects 
spin ideas about what software components could be deployed, what underlying technology 
could be used, and how potential solutions could be integrated within the existing government 
IT systems. At this stage, solution architects from prime and subcontractors go back and forth 
between the purchasing federal agency and the proposing team. Simultaneously, deal shapers, 
lawyers, and business administrators work on how to make it easy for the federal agency to 
award a contract. This includes, for example, issues such as what procurement vehicles could 
be used or how the contract contributes to the agency’s minority goals. This stage of the process 
is characterized by intensive team interactions. Communications that aim to put every team 
member on the same level of information is mainly conducted by emailing and phoning. 
Discussions about how a change in the technical solution could potentially affect strategic and 
legal aspects take place in frequent physical team meetings.   
Once the request for proposals is published, federal agencies “shut the door” and there are 
neither formal nor informal meetings at this stage (W25). After viewing the proposals, some 
short-listed government contractors are invited for “orals”, meaning that three key team 
members defend their solution in person to the purchasing agency. Orals can be followed by 
negotiations which are, again, face-to-face meetings. In the actual development of the service, 
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government contractors benefit from spatial proximity as solutions are often deployed onsite in 
the offices of the government clients.  
The importance of being located in Washington, D.C. not only arises from spatial proximity to 
the government clients but also from spatial proximity to other CC-RIS actors. Spatial 
proximity to procurement partner firms is clearly important. Large government contractors have 
SMEs subcontracting programs and they organize many networking events such as “speed 
dating”, where SMEs can pitch their ideas and establish relationships with large government 
contractors. In some cases, federal agencies organize pre-bid conferences where interested 
government contractors come together in one place and can ask questions about the upcoming 
procurement project. During such conferences, government contractors observe what 
competitors are present, how competitors position themselves and with whom they collaborate. 
In addition, spatial proximity helps to collect information on competitors. For example, one 
interviewee described how two government contractors are currently battling for becoming the 
“top dog” in content management capabilities in Washington, D.C. (W29). So it was an 
important strategic decision whether to go in that race and build that capability or to position 
themselves as a subcontractor. The firm benefited from the location in Washington, D.C. to 
collect opinions and views that provided a sound basis for the decision not to compete but to 
position itself as a partner firm.    
Spatial proximity helps government contractors to better attune to federal procurement budget 
shifts. Interviewees stressed the importance of constantly interacting with relevant actors in the 
CC-RIS in order to see financial developments in the federal marketplace. For example, federal 
procurement of IT systems of the Department of Defense decreased by $1.1 billion (-3.1%) 
from fiscal year 2014 to 2015, while federal procurement of IT systems of non-defense agencies 
increased by $3.5 billion (7.9%) in the same period of time (PSC 2015). The relevance of 
following budgets is also reflected in many commissioned work for think tanks and specialized 
consulting firms. Resulting from these interactions, firms get a clear picture of where the money 
is going. Government contractors react to shifts in federal procurement spending, for example, 
by adjusting partner relationships. According to many interviewees, firms that are located 
outside the region are typically less involved in such knowledge sharing. When certain budgets 
decline, contractors try to cut back on subcontractors and those firms that are located outside 
the region are less involved in knowledge networks and suffer the first (W28).     
Regarding the threat of lock-in, interviews indicate that there is not much change in the set of 
actors. When talking about CC-RIS, interviewees often used terms such as “usual suspects” or 
“same set of players over and over again” (W6, W16, W30). One government official was 
talking about restricted procurement procedures, when he noted: 
“Even if you open up the competition to the entire world, you’re probably only going to get 
three, four, five bids. The fact that in theory, a company in Minnesota, Montana or Switzerland 
could submit a bid is irrelevant. They are not going to. You’re going to get bids from Northtrop 
Grumman, BAE Systems, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon.” (W4) 
The quote illustrates the threat of lock-in. Since Washington, D.C. has such a huge power of 
attraction for federal procurement activities, federal procurement activities are strongly 
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concentrated in the capital city. In this regard, the term “bubble” was used from a few 
interviewees which may point to overembeddedness.  
However, the interviews indicate that this holds true for extra-firm linkages, whereas intra-firm 
linkages act as important pipelines. Indeed, many of the large government contractors have a 
specialized division for government clients whereas the rest of the firm is focused on private 
market industries. One interviewee from a multi-national government contractor used the 
metaphor of a spear to describe the relation between the several firm divisions (W30): The 
federal government specialized division is the spearhead that is completely shaped to do 
business with the federal government. However, once they have acquired access, the firm 
reaches back to the larger firm to leverage capabilities and talent. Nevertheless, the exchange 
of information between the firm divisions can be problematic due to strict security guidelines.            
 
Diversification 
The development of the Internet is the most prominent example of where regional actors were 
able to translate knowledge derived from federal procurement into the private sector (Ceruzzi 
2008; Mowery and Simcoe 2002). The general challenge to replicate such a success story turned 
into a heated discussion in 2010. Federal procurement spending has been declining since 2010, 
after decades of rapid growth with a peak at $550 billion in 2009 (Gordon 2012). The recent 
decline has drawn much attention to the issue of diversification. 
Interviewees from firms and regional economic development agencies concurred that cyber 
security and health IT are the sectors that are best for generating knowledge and winning new 
government clients as well as private sector clients. Both sectors are endowed with risk-taking 
and innovation-oriented agencies such as Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Institutes of Health (NIH), and 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration. Describing different 
government clients, one interviewee noted that “there are pockets of the federal government 
that are leading edge technologies and there are pockets of the federal government that are 20 
years laggards” (W15). Thus the U.S. federal government is by no means uniform in terms of 
federal procurement and the commitment to innovation differs radically across federal agencies 
(Vonortas 2015). 
Government contractors bring knowledge derived from federal procurement into the private 
sector through corporate spin-offs. Government contractors expand their knowledge stock 
through federal procurement but lack the capacity to exploit it through private sector clients in 
the same business unit. “Commercial and federal are very hard to marry”, explained one 
interviewee who highlighted different cultures between the two sectors (W15). The business 
model of government contractors is highly adjusted to federal procurement. They have built the 
capacities and resources they need to shape, move and finance federal procurement contracts 
as well as develop, subcontract, and integrate the required technical solutions. However, due to 
their specialization in federal procurement, they are not well equipped to serve private sector 
clients from the same business unit. This holds in particularly true for “the elephants”, as 
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sometimes referred to the very large system integrators. Thus, they create corporate spin-offs 
that exclusively serve private sector clients.  
To promote employee spin-offs in cybersecurity, regional economic agencies have set up 
specific accelerators and incubators. The Entrepreneur Center at the Northern Virginia 
Technology Council (NVTC) is a prime example of a program that targets employees of 
government contractors who want to form a new firm in cybersecurity. The Center provides 
mentoring programs, events, and contacts to enable individuals to leave the bigger firms and 
start their own firms. The typical entrepreneur of this program is not the 20-something year old 
coming right out of school but a federal procurement experienced, mid-aged person who has 
gained technical skills through many years of work in federal procurement (W7). However, 
while some new firms penetrate private sector industries, the majority of new firms sell to the 
parent government contractor. Thus, employee spin-offs do not contribute per se to the region 
becoming less dependent on federal government spending, but can sometimes rather be seen as 
a way to keep subcontracting activities in the region.    
Exploitation through private sector clients often takes place outside of Washington, D.C. Both 
promising employee spin-offs that have demonstrated their innovation capacity as well as 
corporate spin-offs of government contractors very often get bought from firms external to the 
region and much of the talent and knowledge leaves Washington, D.C. Several interviewees 
mentioned that Washington, D.C.’s CC-RIS is not well equipped with the appropriate 
environment as well as actors for private market growth (W15, W16). For example, regional 
venture capitalists and equity firms are rather long-term focused and not that experienced with 
short holding periods and growth accelerations in the more aggressive “buy and build” practices 
in some private sector industries. Spatial proximity to the new clients is important to apply 
acquired knowledge in the new domains, but new clients are often located outside the region.  
In summary, the case of Washington, D.C. illustrates a CC-RIS that is characterized by many 
specialized private and public sector organizations that stimulate cooperative and joint activities 
between government contractors, knowledge organizations, and federal agencies. The strong 
endowment of intermediaries has strengthened the link between federal procurement policies 
and innovation. Yet, a major challenge for regional policymakers is to keep innovation in the 
region, because the exploitation through private sector clients partly takes place outside the 
region.  
 
5 Synthesis and analysis 
The four case regions show that government contractors benefit from spatial proximity through 
access to federal procurement information. In all four cases, government contractors evaluated 
spatial proximity to government clients as critical for their success in winning federal 
procurement projects. This is a counter-intuitive result. One might expect that publishing of 
federal business opportunities, transparent selection of proposals, and publicly available reports 
and studies decrease the importance of co-location. To the contrary, it seems that the fact that a 
lot of information is publicly available rather increases the importance of spatial proximity since 
it is one of the few possibilities of gaining competitive advantage. Almost all government 
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contractors used this phrase in one form or another: “If you are identifying opportunities based 
on when they become publicly available, you are already starting behind the game” (W15). 
The time advantage is used to look for partners, gain knowledge about what solutions the 
government client expects, and prepare possible solutions “since you still have to have a better 
solution as determined by a jury” (W15). 
The study supports the expected relationships between federal innovation policies, endowment 
of intermediaries, and capability to diversify: The more sophisticated the federal procurement 
innovation policies are, the stronger the endowment with intermediary organizations is. 
Correspondence is strengthened through positive reinforcement. Intermediary organizations 
improve federal procurement practices from a supplier’s perspective. Through improved 
procedures, government contractors are better positioned to generate technical knowledge since 
there is more flexibility in the procurement process. The exploration of technical knowledge in 
federal procurement enables government contractors to exploit their knowledge through private 
sector clients.  
It was expected that if government contractors generate only federal procurement knowledge 
they improve their possibilities of winning other government clients but they do not improve 
their possibilities of winning private sector clients. While this can be confirmed from a strict 
knowledge-based view, they still benefit from federal procurement through an enhanced 
reputation. Federal agencies are expected to be objective so that references provide trustworthy 
information (Glückler and Armbruster 2003). Even if government contractors have exclusively 
generated federal procurement knowledge, they nevertheless improve their possibilities of 
winning private sector clients through an enhanced reputation.   
There are significant differences in terms of knowledge dynamics between the four cases (see 
table 2). In Bern, there is a lack of intermediaries and government contractors have mainly one-
on-one relationships with government officials. In Ottawa, national sector associations facilitate 
collective knowledge dynamics to some extent. In The Hague, the proactive municipality 
stimulates innovation activities between various CC-RIS actors. In Washington, D.C., a strong 
endowment of public and private actors has led to many instruments which have stimulated 
regional knowledge exchange.  
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Table 2 Summary of key findings 
Case 
study 
region 
Federal 
procurement 
policy context 
 
 
 CC-RIS actors and linkages  Spatial proximity and 
knowledge generation 
 Diversification 
 Link between 
federal 
procurement 
and innovation 
 Endowment of 
intermediating 
actors 
Knowledge 
support system 
System failures  Proximity to 
whom 
Main type 
of know-
ledge 
generated 
 Factors 
stimulating 
diversifi-
cation 
Main new 
clients 
            
Bern Weakly 
developed 
(competitive 
dialogue) 
 Weak 
endowment of 
intermediaries; 
interactions 
occur in form of 
direct personal 
one-on-one 
relationships  
University of 
Bern important 
as educator, 
platform for 
exchange of 
experiences (IT- 
Beschaffungs-
konferenz) 
Organizational 
thinness 
(absence of 
intermediaries); 
lock-in 
 Almost 
exclusively to 
federal 
agencies 
Primarily 
federal 
procurement 
knowledge 
 Reputation 
derived 
from 
government 
clients 
Exploitation 
through other 
Swiss 
government 
clients  
            
Ottawa Moderately 
developed; 
emergence of 
innovation 
support (BCIP, 
OSME, smart 
procurement) 
 National sector 
associations 
facilitate 
knowledge 
spillovers 
between public 
and private 
sectors 
University of 
Ottawa and 
Carleton 
University have 
importance as 
educators 
Fragmented 
(lack of 
linkages to 
federal 
laboratories and 
university 
research 
institutes);  
lock-in 
 Federal 
agencies, 
partner firms, 
national sector 
associations 
Primarily 
federal 
procurement 
knowledge 
 Instruments 
that spur 
generation 
of technical 
knowledge 
(BCIP, 
SBIPS)  
Exploitation 
through other 
Canadian 
government 
clients, foreign 
government 
clients, private 
sector clients   
            
The Hague Strongly 
developed 
(PIANOo, 
SBIR, pre-
commercial 
procurement, 
NIAS) 
 HSD as an 
important 
platform for 
stimulating and 
coordinating 
knowledge 
exchange 
Public-sector 
specialized 
knowledge 
providers (TNO, 
HCSS); 
local universities 
take part in joint 
research projects 
(CSI The Hague) 
Fragmentation 
(overcoming); 
lock-in 
 Federal 
agencies, 
partner firms,  
think tanks, 
knowledge 
organizations, 
international 
organizations 
Federal 
procurement 
and technical 
knowledge 
 Increasing 
demand of 
cyber-
security in 
the private 
sector 
Exploitation 
through other 
Dutch govern-
ment clients, 
international 
agencies (i.e. 
Europol, 
NATO), and 
private sector 
clients  
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Table 2 (continued)           
            
Case 
study 
region 
Federal 
procurement 
policy context 
 CC-RIS actors  Spatial proximity and 
knowledge 
 Diversification 
  Link between 
federal 
procurement 
and innovation  
 Endowment of 
intermediating 
actors 
Knowledge 
support system 
System failures  Proximity to 
whom 
Main type 
of 
knowledge 
generated 
 Factors 
stimulating 
diversifi-
cation 
Main new 
clients  
Washing-
ton, D.C. 
Very strongly 
developed 
(Myth-busting, 
SBIR, set-
asides, prefer-
ential price 
treatment and 
training for 
SMEs,...) 
 Strong 
endowment of 
specialized 
private and 
public 
organizations 
that facilitate 
knowledge 
dynamics 
Universities 
involved in joint 
research projects; 
universities act 
as platforms for 
enhancing co-
operation among 
federal agencies, 
government con-
tractors, research 
institutes 
(BRICC) 
Lock-in  Federal 
agencies, 
partner firms, 
national sector 
associations, 
think tanks, 
university 
research 
institutes 
Federal 
procure-
ment and 
technical 
knowledge 
 Risk-taking 
agencies in 
cyber-
security and 
health IT 
(DARPA, 
DHS, NIH); 
contractor-
tailored 
accelerators 
(NVTC) 
Exploitation 
through other 
U.S. govern-
ment clients, 
foreign govern-
ment clients;  
exploitation 
through private 
sector clients 
often realized in 
form of spin-
offs 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
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While it was expected to see lock-in as a distinct deficiency of strongly developed CC-RIS, it 
seems that all CC-RISs are threatened by lock-in to some extent (Tödtling and Trippl 2005). 
Firms that are new to the region help a CC-RIS to remain or become innovative (Sternberg 
2007); however, federal procurement provides many barriers for new firms (in particular for 
SME) to enter the marketplace (Loader 2013). Firms need to invest in training the workforce to 
cope with the complexity of procurement processes and are likely to have some unsuccessful 
bids before they win the first federal procurement contract. Federal procurement information is 
channeled through trusted relationships, in addition to publicly available information. Since a 
single federal procurement project typically involves several agencies and several units within 
these agencies, contractors need to invest a lot of time in relationship building. Entering the 
federal marketplace, thus, requires considerable upfront costs that lead to the same set of 
government contractors.  
 
6 Conclusions 
The purpose of this study has been to examine and present original evidence about CC-RISs 
that are driven by federal procurement. The findings demonstrate that federal procurement 
causes unique knowledge dynamics in capital cities. First, capital cities provide important 
intermediary functions that are beneficial for the development of innovation in federal 
procurement. Intermediary functions are primarily provided by actors such as partner firms, 
national sector associations, and semi-public development organizations. These actors provide 
opportunities for collective learning (Asheim 2007). They organize cumulative knowledge 
sharing among different actors and coordinate collective actions. As such, their contribution 
consists of stimulating systemic knowledge flows rather than linking individual actors (Edler 
& Yeow, 2016). Second, spatial proximity supports trusted relationships and an ongoing share 
of ideas between government contractors and government officials which in turn favors the 
development of more innovative solutions. Aside from co-location to government clients, 
government contractors benefit from constant circulation of federal procurement information 
in capital cities. Third, the extent to which federal procurement contributes to regional 
economic diversification depends on the way federal procurement is organized. Federal 
procurement in which government contractors generate technical knowledge enables them to 
exploit their knowledge through private sector clients. Federal procurement in which 
government contractors generate federal procurement knowledge mainly enables them to 
exploit their knowledge through other federal government clients. In this case, the region still 
depends on federal government spending.  
This study contributes to the theoretical discussion about RIS in at least two major ways. First, 
the study suggests that knowledge dynamics derived from federal business opportunities unfold 
in distinct ways. Intermediaries are critical for carrying out innovation activities. Being located 
in the capital city provides decisive time advantages in the procurement process. Selecting of 
partner firms is restricted due to security requirements. The extant literature about knowledge 
sourcing patterns found that spatial distribution of knowledge sources is influenced by 
underlying knowledge bases, types of innovation, and competencies of firms (Blažek et al. 
2011; Martin 2013; Tödtling and Grillitsch 2014). The research at hand suggests that the type 
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of client (public/private) constitutes another key dimension for explaining knowledge sourcing 
patterns. Second, the degree to which the predominant regional industry is interwoven with 
federal innovation policies constraints innovation activities in RIS. The study shows how 
federal innovation policies shape interaction patterns in capital cities. It also shows how in 
return regional actors influence federal innovation policies. The interplay between regional and 
federal innovation policies might also be of key importance in other types of RIS that host 
government-dominated industries such as biotechnology, energy, or transportation. The 
concept’s focus on regional innovation policies bears the risk of underestimating the mutual 
influence of policies between regional and federal levels. Specifically, it downplays the fact 
that regions are not only “receivers” of federal innovation policies but that they participate in 
the formulation of federal innovation policies (Howells 2005).  
The study also provides implications for the theoretical discussion about federal procurement 
as a driver of innovation. Although PPI draws on the general innovation system concept 
(Edquist et al. 2015), this study is the first that applies the regional innovation system concept. 
This comes as a surprise given the overall acknowledgement of regions as important places of 
innovation. The study shows that knowledge sharing between government contractors and 
government officials takes place beyond the scope of a particular project. PPI literature heavily 
uses case study methods in which particular federal procurement projects constitute cases (Edler 
et al. 2005). Therefore, PPI literature underrates the importance of ongoing interactions, 
including phases, when no federal procurement project is in sight. 
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